SonicWall Cloud Backup File Incident: Technical Analysis
- Adrian Tregent

- Sep 19
- 3 min read

SonicWall has recently disclosed a MySonicWall Cloud Backup File Incident impacting a specific subset of customers whose firewall configuration ("preference") files were stored in the cloud. Although SonicWall has confirmed that encrypted credentials were included in these files, the exposure of additional configuration data heightens the risk profile associated with this incident.
This analysis provides a detailed examination of the technical aspects of the incident, its significance, and the immediate steps that should be taken.
Incident Overview
Attack Vector: Threat actors executed brute force attacks on MySonicWall’s backup storage, gaining unauthorized access to a small portion of backup files.
Scope: Fewer than 5% of all SonicWall firewalls with cloud backup enabled were impacted.
Data Exposure:
Encrypted credentials contained within preference files.
Details of firewall configuration (enabled services, system settings, metadata).
Serial numbers and identifiers that could facilitate future targeted attacks.
Excluded: SonicWall reports no evidence of ransomware deployment or data exfiltration beyond access to backup files. No widespread data leaks have been observed.
Technical Risks
Although credentials within preference files were encrypted, the exposed metadata introduces several risks:
Service Enumeration
Attackers could determine which services (SSL VPN, IPSec, DPI-SSL, etc.) are active, narrowing the attack surface for further exploitation.
Credential Replay Potential
If credentials were weak or reused across systems, brute force or offline cracking attempts could succeed despite encryption.
Device Fingerprinting
Serial numbers and system details can be exploited in social engineering campaigns, firmware-targeted attacks, or to create convincing phishing payloads.
Configuration Exploitation
Backup files often contain policy configurations, NAT rules, and user/group definitions. Even without direct password exposure, this intelligence can significantly reduce attacker reconnaissance time.
Recommended Technical Response
For administrators managing SonicWall deployments, the following actions are critical:
Audit Cloud Backup Usage
- Log into MySonicWall → confirm whether backups are enabled per device.
- Check Product Management → Issue List for flagged serial numbers.
Rotate All Credentials
- Immediately reset firewall admin credentials, VPN accounts, and any stored service credentials.
- Enforce unique, complex passwords and implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) wherever possible.
Configuration Hardening
- Review all enabled services. Disable legacy or unused services (e.g., PPTP, weak SSL ciphers, management over WAN).
- Apply the latest SonicOS firmware updates and ensure IPS signatures are current.
Logging & Monitoring
- Enable syslog exports to SIEM platforms for anomaly detection.
- Monitor for unusual login attempts, failed authentications, or configuration changes.
Backup Strategy Re-Evaluation
- Store configurations in offline or segmented repositories rather than solely relying on vendor-managed cloud backups.
- Apply encryption and access control at the organization’s level, not just vendor-provided.
Incident Response Readiness
- Develop a playbook for firewall compromise scenarios.
- Test rollback and restore procedures for critical firewall policies.
Lessons for MSPs and Security Teams
Vendor Dependency = Shared Risk
Relying on vendor cloud backups introduces exposure beyond your own environment. Always assume vendor-side incidents are possible.
Configuration Data is Attack Fuel
Even without credential compromise, leaked preference files accelerate attacker kill chains by removing reconnaissance barriers.
Defense in Depth is Mandatory
Firewalls should be treated as high-value assets—credentials, configurations, and backups must all be secured with MFA, encryption, and limited access scope.
Conclusion
The SonicWall Cloud Backup File Incident highlights that encrypted backups do not equate to invulnerable backups. Even partial exposure of preference files provides attackers with valuable intelligence that can be operationalized in future campaigns.
Administrators should take this event as a call to action: verify your exposure, rotate credentials, harden services, and reassess how and where firewall backups are stored.




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